scale of 0 ("no risk") to 10 ("extreme risk"), a general risk-concern measure that furnishes a parsimonious focus for such testing [8] [9] .
SCT asserts, first, that ordinary members of the public underestimate the seriousness of climate change because of the difficulty of the scientific evidence 3 . If this is correct, concern over climate change should be positively correlated with science literacy-that is, concern should increase as people become more science literate.
Second, and even more important, SCT attributes low concern with climate change to limits on the ability of ordinary members of the public to engage in technical reasoning. Recent research in psychology posits two discrete forms of information processing: "System 1," which involves rapid visceral judgments that manifest themselves in various decision-making "heuristics"; and "System 2," which requires conscious reflection and calculation 10 . Most members of the public, according to this research, typically employ System 1 reasoning without resorting to more effortful System 2 processing. Although System 1 works well for most daily contingencies, citizens' predominant reliance on heuristic rather than more analytic modes of reasoning is viewed as leading them to underestimate climate-change risks, which are remote and abstract compared to a host of more emotionally charged risks (e.g., terrorism) that the public is thought to overestimate [2] [3] . If this position is correct, one would also expect concern with climate change to be positively correlated with numeracy. Numeracy refers to the capacity of individuals to comprehend and make use of quantitative information 11 . More numerate people are more disposed to use accuracy-enhancing forms of System 2 reasoning and to be less vulnerable to the cognitive errors associated with System 1 [11] [12] . Hence, they should, on this view, form perceptions of climate-change risk less biased toward underestimation.
These predictions were unsupported ( Fig. 1) . As respondents' science-literacy scores increased, concern with climate change decreased (r = -0.05, p = 0.05). There was also a negative correlation between numeracy and climate-change risk (r = -0.09, p < 0.01). The differences were small, but nevertheless inconsistent with SCT, which predicts effects with the opposite signs. CCT also generates a testable prediction. CCT posits that persons who subscribe to a "hierarchical, individualistic" worldview-one that ties authority to conspicuous social rankings and eschews collective interference with the decisions of individuals possessing such authority-tend to be skeptical of environmental risks. Such people intuitively perceive that widespread acceptance of such risks would license restrictions on commerce and industry, forms of behavior that Hierarchical Individualists value. In contrast, persons who hold an "egalitarian, communitarian" worldview-one favoring less regimented forms of social organization and greater collective attention to individual needs-tend to be morally suspicious of commerce and industry, to which they attribute social inequity. They therefore find it congenial to believe those forms of behavior are dangerous and worthy of restriction 4 . On this view, one would expect Egalitarian Communitarians to be more concerned than Hierarchical Individualists with climate change risks.
Our data, consistent with previous studies 6 , supported this prediction. "Hierarchical Individualists" (subjects who scored in the top half on both the Hierarchy and Individualism cultural-worldview scales) rated climate-change risks significantly lower (M = 3.15, SEM = 0.17) than did Egalitarian Communitarians (subjects whose scores placed them in the bottom half) (M = 7.4, SEM = 0.13). Even controlling for scientific literacy and numeracy (as reflected in the composite scale "Science Literacy/Numeracy"; see "Supplementary Information," SI), both Hierarchy (b = -0.46, p < 0.01) and Individualism (b = -0.30, p < 0.01) predicted less concern over climate change (Table S4 ).
These findings were consistent, too, with previous ones showing that climate change has become highly politicized [13] [14] . Cultural-worldview and political-orientation measures are modestly correlated.
Nevertheless, the impact that cultural worldviews have on climate-change risk perceptions cannot be reduced to partisanship. The mean Hierarchical Individualist in our sample was an "Independent" who "leans Republican" and is "slightly conservative"; the mean Egalitarian Communitarian was also an "Independent," but one who "leans Democrat" and is "slightly liberal" (Fig. S4) . The difference between their respective perceptions of climate-change risk, however, significantly exceeded what politicalorientation measures alone would predict for individuals who identify themselves as "conservative Republicans" and "liberal Democrats" (Fig. S5 ).
The finding that cultural worldviews explain more variance than science literacy and numeracy, however, does not by itself demonstrate that SCT is less supportable than CCT. SCT asserts not merely that members of the public lack scientific knowledge but also that they lack the habits of mind needed to assimilate it, and are thus constrained to rely on fallible heuristic alternatives. Proponents of this "bounded rationality" position treat cultural cognition-the conforming of beliefs to the ones that predominate within one's group-as simply one of the unreliable System 1 heuristics used to compensate for the inability to assess scientific information in a dispassionate, analytical manner. But this SCT prediction, too, was unsupported. Among Egalitarian Communitarians, science literacy and numeracy (as reflected in the composite scale "Science Literacy/Numeracy"), showed a small positive correlation with concern about climate-change risks (r = 0.08, p = 0.03). But among Hierarchical
Individualists, Science Literacy/Numeracy is negatively correlated with concern (r = -0.12, p = 0.03).
Hence, polarization actually becomes larger, not smaller, as science literacy and numeracy increase ( Fig. 2 ; Table S4 & Fig. S3 ). Because the contribution that culture makes to disagreement grows as science literacy and numeracy increase, it is not plausible to view cultural cognition as a heuristic substitute for the knowledge or capacities that SCT views the public as lacking.
To test the generality of this conclusion, we also analyzed subjects' perceptions of nuclear-power risks. Egalitarian Communitarians and Hierarchical Individualists were again polarized. Moreover, here, too, the gap between subjects with these outlooks became larger, not smaller as scientific literacy and numeracy increased (Table S5 ; Fig. S3 ). Extending research that casts doubt on the "knowledge deficit" explanation 16 for public controversy over climate-change and other environmental risks, these findings suggest that "bounded rationality" is an unsatisfactory explanation as well.
On the contrary, our findings could be viewed as evidence of how remarkably well equipped ordinary individuals are to discern which stances toward scientific information secure their personal interests. We will elaborate on this interpretation, which we offer as our own best provisional understanding of the results of this and related studies, but which we also believe warrants corroboration by experimental testing. We stress, too, that as consequential as cultural cognition is for disagreement over climate change, it does not imply the irrelevance of other, more general impediments to public engagement with climatechange science, including trust in communicators and the affective attenuation of risks seen by many as remote in time and place 17 .
For the ordinary individual, the most consequential effect of his beliefs about climate change is likely to be on his relations with his peers 18 . A Hierarchical Individualist who expresses anxiety about climate change might well be shunned by his coworkers at an oil refinery in Oklahoma City. A similar fate will likely befall the Egalitarian Communitarian English professor who reveals to colleagues in Boston that she thinks the "scientific consensus" on climate change is a "hoax." At the same time, neither the personal beliefs an ordinary person forms about scientific evidence nor any actions he takes-as a con- Methods. Study subjects consisted of a nationally representative general population sample of 1540 Americans who participated in the study via the on-line testing facilities of Knowledge Networks.
Knowledge Networks (http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/) is a public opinion research firm with offices located throughout the United States. It maintains an active respondent pool of some 50,000 adults who are recruited to participate in online surveys and experiments administered on behalf of academic and governmental researchers and private businesses. Its recruitment and sampling methods assure a diverse sample that is demographically representative of the U.S. population.
We measured respondents' values using scales associated with studies of the "cultural theory of risk" [4] [5] . The first, Hierarchy-Egalitarianism ("Hierarchy"), consists of "agree-disagree" items that indicate attitudes toward social orderings that connect authority to stratified social roles based on highly conspicuous and largely fixed characteristics such as gender, race, and class ("We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites and people of color, and men and women"). Items from the second scale, Individualism-Communitarianism ("Individualism"), express attitudes toward social orderings in which the individual is expected to secure his or her own well-being without assistance or interference from society versus ones in which society is obliged and empowered to secure collective wel-fare in the face of competing individual interests (e.g., "Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don't get in the way of what's good for society").
We measured respondents' "science literacy" with National Science Foundation's "Science and
Engineering Those risk perceptions were measured with GWRISK and NUKERISK, which asked respondents to indicate "How much risk" they believed "climate change" and "nuclear power," respectively, "pose[] to human health, safety, or prosperity" on a 0 ("no risk") to 10 ("extreme risk") scale. Risk-perception items that conform to this format are known to elicit responses that correlate highly with ones targeted at more specific factual beliefs about the hazards of putative risk sources and are thus routinely used as a parsimonious focus for analysis of variance in risk perceptions [8] [9] .
Study hypotheses were tested by ordinary least squares linear regression (Table S4 & Table S5 ).
Predictors included the cultural worldview scales, Science Literacy/Numeracy, and appropriate crossproduct interaction terms. To promote visual comprehension of the variance associated with various predictors, responses to GWRISK (M = 5.7, SD = 3.4) and NUKERISK (M = 6.1, SD = 3.0) were transformed into z-scores.
Full item wording for all measures and the multivariate regression outputs are reported in the on- The sample for this survey, conducted in January 2010, was 52% female, 76% white, and 8%
African-American. The average age was 47 years. The median household income for the sample was $50,000-$59,000. The median educational level was "some college."
Statistical power
The anticipated statistical analyses required a relatively large sample. Inferences drawn from the absence of hypothesized effects (or the existence of hypothesized null effects), moreover, present a significant risk of Type II error in underpowered studies 1 . In addition, interactions between individual characteristics such as cultural values and science literacy or numeracy tend to be small and thus to evade detection in observational studies with modest-sized samples 2 . The sample size used in this study was sufficient to detect the significance (at p < 0.05) of even "small" effects (e.g., r = 0.10) at a power exceeding the conventional 0.80 cutoff 2, 3 .
Measures
a. Cultural worldviews. Subjects' cultural values or "worldviews" were measured with items used in previous studies of cultural cognition 4-5. These items characterize worldviews along two cross-cutting dimensions: Hierarchy-Egalitarianism ("Hierarchy") and Individualism-Communitarianism ("Individualism") ( Table S1 ). The former set of items indicate attitudes toward social orderings that connect authority to stratified social roles based on highly conspicuous and largely fixed characteristics The sample for this survey, conducted in January 2010, was 52% female, 76% white, and 8%
Statistical power
The anticipated statistical analyses required a relatively large sample. Inferences drawn from the absence of hypothesized effects (or the existence of hypothesized null effects), moreover, present a significant risk of Type II error in underpowered studies (Table S1 ). The former set of items indicate attitudes toward social orderings that connect authority to stratified social roles based on highly conspicuous and largely fixed characteristics such as gender, race, and class. The latter indicate attitudes toward social orderings that reflect an expectation that individuals will secure their own well-being without assistance or interference from society versus those that assign society the obligation to secure collective welfare and the power to override competing individual interests. For all items, subjects indicated agreement or disagreement on a six-point scale. The theory on which cultural cognition is based posits that perceptions of environmental and technological risks should be expected to diminish as worldviews become simultaneously more hierarchical and individualistic, and increase as worldviews become simultaneously more egalitarian and communitarian. Other types of risks, including ones relating to public health and social deviance, can be expected to vary more dramatically as worldviews become progressively more hierarchical and communitarian or progressively more egalitarian and individualistic. Survey and experimental studies have found support for these predictions [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . For this study, we used short-form versions of Hierarchy and Individualism (Table S1) , each of which consisted of six items 9 . Like the full-form versions, the two six-item sets formed reliable scales (Hierarchy, α = 0.84; Individualism, α = 0.76), the items of which loaded appropriately on two separate factors, which were labeled "Hierarchy" and "Individualism" and used as predictors for the study.
Hierarchy

Individualism-Communitarianism (Individualism)
IINTRSTS.
The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives.
CHARM.
Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting themselves.
IPROTECT. It's not the government's business to try to protect people from themselves.
IPRIVACY.
The government should stop telling people how to live their lives.
CPROTECT.
The government should do more to advance society's goals, even if that means limiting the freedom and choices of individuals.
CLIMCHOI.
Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don't get in the way of what's good for society.
Hierarchy-Egalitarianism (Hierarchy)
HEQUAL.
We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.
EWEALTH. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal.
ERADEQ.
We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites and people of color, and men and women.
EDISCRIM. Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society.
HREVDIS2.
It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals and other groups don't want equal rights, they want special rights just for them.
HFEMININ. Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
12%
SHANE2.
In a lake, there is a patch of lilypads. Every day, the patch doubles in size.
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 15 . We included eight NSF Indicator items in the survey (Table S3) 
27%
Multivariate analyses
We performed two sets of multivariate regression analyses to test the various hypotheses associated with SCT. The outcome variables were GWRISK and NUKERISK, which asked respondents to indicate "How much risk" they believed "climate change" and "nuclear power," respectively, "pose[] to human health, safety, or prosperity" on a 0 ("no risk") to 10 ("extreme risk") scale. To improve visual comprehension of the variance associated with various predictors, responses to GWRISK (M = 5.7, SD = 3.4) and NUKERISK (M = 6.1, SD = 3.0) were transformed into z-scores.
We combined Sciliteracy and Numeracy into a composite scale (α = 0.85), labeled "Science Literacy/Numeracy," to avoid collinearity in analyses of their association with the outcome variables 16 .
The z-score transformation of Science Literacy/Numeracy (z_Sci/Num) was used as a predictor in the regression analyses in order to center the variable at 0 and thereby enhance the interpretability of models with cross-product interaction terms. In addition, cross-product variables ("Hierarch x z_Sci/Num" and "Individ x z_Sci/Num") were constructed to test for interactions between Science Literacy/Numeracy and the two worldview measures 17 . centered at 0, the regression coefficients for the predictor and moderator variables in models that contain crossproduct interaction terms indicate the effect of the relevant variable when the other is at its mean value 17 . Missing values for individual cultural-worldview items and for GWRISK were replaced using multiple imputation 18 .
Sequential models were used to test the impact of Science Literacy/Numeracy, the cultural worldviews, and the interactions of these variables. In the first step, risk perceptions were regressed on Science Literacy/Numeracy alone, which predicted less concern for both climate-change (Table S4, Model 1) and nuclear risk perceptions (Table S5 , Model 1).
The cultural-worldview variables were entered next. Both Hierarchy and Individualism predicted less concern for the two forms of risk perception (Table S4 , Model 2; Table S5 , Model 2).
The analyses associated with Model 2 show the impact of the cultural outlooks controlling for differences in the level of science literacy and numeracy. The large and statistically significant impact of the worldview predictors thus confirms that the contribution they make to variance in perceptions of climate change risk is not a consequence of differences in science literacy or numeracy levels among subjects with one or the other of these worldviews.
In the final step, variables to test for the interaction between science literacy and numeracy, on the one hand, and the cultural-worldview variables, on the other, were added to the analyses (Table S4,   Model 3; Table S5 , Model 3). In both models, the coefficients for the cross-product terms are negative (indicating that the impact of Hierarchy and Individualism in reducing climate-change and nuclear-power risk perceptions increases as Sci/Num increases). Although only one of the individual cross-product interaction terms is significant on its own in each analysis, the combined effect of the cross-product interaction terms as a set was significant for both, as confirmed by the significance change in F-statistic in Model 3 of the respective analyses 19 . The joint effect sizes of these interactions were in line with ones commonly detected in observational studies 2 . Table S5 . Multivariate regression analyses of nuclear power risk perceptions. N = 1540. The effects of the model predictors are expressed in unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with t-statistic indicated parenthetically. The outcome variable is the standardized (z-score) response to NUKERISK. Bolded indicates that the coefficient, F-statistic, or the change in F-statistic is significant at p < 0.05. Note that because all predictors are centered at 0, the regression coefficients for the predictor and moderator variables in models that contain crossproduct interaction terms indicate the effect of the relevant variable when the other is at its mean value 17 . Missing values for individual cultural-worldview items and for NUKERISK were replaced using multiple imputation 18 .
Because the impact of even the nonsignificant predictors can result in a significant effect when aggregated consistent with study hypotheses, the most straightforward and informative means to test the hypotheses is to use the regression model to estimate the impact (including confidence intervals) of relevant combinations of predictors [20] [21] . Such estimates, based on Model 3 of the respective regression analyses, are reported graphically in Fig. S2 . The results confirm the lack of support for the conclusion that science literacy and numeracy predict increased risk concern for climate-change risk perceptions. The results also confirm that the cultural-worldview variables predict both sets of risk perceptions independently of science literacy and numeracy (that is, when Science Literacy/Numeracy is controlled for by being set to its mean).
Finally, they demonstrate that as science literacy and numeracy (as reflected in Science Literacy/Numeracy) increase, cultural polarization increases for both climate-change risk perceptions and nuclear-power risk perceptions (Fig. S3 ). Higher levels of science literacy and numeracy predict a more substantial abatement of concern over nuclear-power risks (b = 0.30, p < 0.01) than over climate-change risk (b = -0.09, p < 0.01). This effect, however, is significantly more pronounced among subjects whose worldviews are hierarchical and individualist than among those whose worldviews are egalitarian and communitarian (Fig. S3) . Thus, for nuclear-power risk perceptions, as for climate-change risk perceptions, polarization grows as science literacy and numeracy increase (Fig. S3) . Table S4 & Table S5, respectively. Bars indicate how much larger cultural polarization is when science-literacy and numeracy are high as opposed to low. The estimates are derived by comparing how much larger the difference in the estimated values of the outcome variable between "Hierarchical Individualist" (+1 SD on both worldview scales) and "Egalitarian
Communitarian" (-1 SD on both scales) are when (1) the predictor value for Science Literacy/Numeracy is set at a "high" value (+1 SD) than it is when (2) the predictor value for Science Literacy/Numeracy is set at a "low" value (-1 SD), with product-interaction term values being correspondingly. CIs indicate 0.95 level of confidence.
Political-orientation measures compared to cultural-worldview ones
We also collected data on our subjects' political orientations. For this purpose, we used two a. Political orientations in relation to cultural worldviews. In the main text, we report means and regression estimates for the "typical Egalitarian Communitarian" and the "typical Hierarchical Individualist." As an expositional device-one that identifies the subsets of study respondents in whom sample-wide variance is most strongly concentrated-this is equivalent to reporting similar data for subsamples who self-identify as "Republicans" and "Democrats" or as "liberals" and "conservatives" Nevertheless, in our sample, subjects whom we would characterize as "Egalitarian Communitarians" and "Hierarchal Individualists" (based on the relationship of their Hierarchy and Individualism scores to the means on the worldview scales) are more moderate in their political orientations than the ones who self-identify as "Democrat" or "Republican," or as "liberal" or "conservative" without qualification (Fig. S4) When the values for REPUB and CONSERV were set at levels corresponding to the scores of the average Hierarchical Individualist (5.18 and 5.10) and Egalitarian Communitarian (2.60 and 3.34), the predicted difference in risk perceptions was even more modest (ΔEM = -0.66, t-statistic = 22.02, p < 0.01). A model based only on political orientation predictors, then, would thus substantially underestimate the degree of polarization that exists between typical Hierarchical Individualists, on the one hand, and the typical Egalitarian Communitarians, on the other (Fig. S5) This reflects the greater precision of the cultural-worldview measures in identifying sources of variance within the sample. Adding cultural-worldview measures to a model with political-orientation measures (Table S6, c. Science Literacy and numeracy. We also created parallel models to examine whether the political-orientation measures, like the cultural-worldview ones we used in our study, interact with Science literacy/Numeracy (Table S7 ). They do.
Because results for analyses performed separately for the two risk perception measures generated near-identical results, we present a single analysis based on ENVRISK, a composite environmental-risk perception measure formed by summing the z-score responses to GWRISK and NUKERISK (α = 0.57).
We then constructed parallel models in which, first, Science Literacy/Numeracy plus the relevant dispositional variables-the cultural-worldview measures or the political-orientation measures-and, thereafter, cross-product interaction terms were entered in sequence. (Table S7 , Model 1(a)), both worldview predictors strongly predict reduced concern with environmental risk. Both cross-product interaction terms (Model 1(b)) are significant and have negative signs, indicating that as Science Literacy/Numeracy increases, the risk-skepticism associated with Hierarchy and Individualism (and correspondingly the risk-sensitivity associated with Egalitarianism and Communitarianism) increase. Table S7 . Environmental risk perceptions. N = 1540. The effects of the model predictors are expressed in unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with tstatistic indicated parenthetically. The outcome variable is the standardized (z-score) response to ENVRISK. Bolded indicates that the coefficient, F-statistic , or the change in F-statistic is significant at p < 0.05. Note that because all predictors are centered at 0, the regression coefficients for the predictor and moderator variables in models that contain cross-product interaction terms indicate the effect of the relevant variable when the other is at its mean value 17 . Missing values for individual cultural worldview items, for political orientation variables, and for indicators of ENVRISK were replaced using multiple imputation 18 .
